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NOTES
THE ROADS THROUGH OUR RUINS: ARCHAEOLOGY AND
SECTION 4(f) OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION ACT
During the last few decades, the federal government has used
two types of statutes to address the problem of archaeological re-
source preservation. The first type specifically protects archaeo-
logical resources.1 The second type involves broad, multi-purpose
legislation that attempts to preserve archaeological, environmental
and historical resources under the umbrella of a single preservation
2provision. This legislation commands preservation of a broad
range of resources from a particular danger, often by requiring that
the government consider environmental issues when fulfilling the
major legislative purpose of a particular statute.3
Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act of 1966,"
which limits the use of parklands and historic sites for transporta-
tion projects, fits within this latter category of legislation. Congress
enacted section 4(f) to avoid the danger of an over-enthusiastic
1. See Antiquities Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 34-209, 34 Stat. 225 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. §§ 431, 432-33 (1982)); Archaeological and Historical Preservation Act, Pub. L.
No. 93-291, 88 Stat. 174 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 469-469c (1982)) (amending
the Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-523, 74 Stat. 220); Archaeological Re-
sources Protection Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-95, 93 Stat. 721 (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 470aa-47011 (1982)).
2. The most comprehensive protection acts are the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970) (NEPA), and the National Historic Preserva-
tion Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915 (1985) (NHPA).
3. See, e.g., Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, § 522, 30 U.S.C.
§ 1272 (1982) (restricting surface mining in or near parks, wildlife refuges, recreation areas
and historic sites). Section 18 of the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, 23 U.S.C. § 138
(1982), is identical to the present codified version of section 4(f). See infra note 7.
For a discussion of issues common to statutes in this category, and specifically to NEPA,
NHPA and section 4(f), see Note, Federal Historic Preservation Law: Uneven Standards
for Our Nation's Heritage, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 189 (1980).
4. Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 4(f), Act of October 15, 1966, 80 Stat. 931, 934 (1966) (current
version codified at 49 U.S.C. § 303 (Supp. 1985)).
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agency. The Department of Transportation Act of 1966 created a
new Cabinet-level agency whose major mission is to build roads.
More than two million linear miles of the United States are now
paved,5 and this figure excludes land used for airports, parking
lots, railroads, and other transportation projects. Such massive
road building, however, poses a particularly acute danger to
archaeological resources. In addition to the possibility of damaging
the artifacts, road construction also destroys the relative location
of the artifacts to each other, rendering the site scientifically
worthless.' These dangers underscore the need to protect archaeo-
logical resources from irrevocable destruction in the national zeal
for an efficient transportation network.
At one time section 4(f) provided sufficient protection. Both the
judicial branch and administrative agencies, however, have weak-
ened it. This Note first examines the legislative history and early
judicial interpretation of section 4(f). The Note then considers how
administrative agencies and courts have weakened the statute. The
Note concludes that this trend is neither valid nor wise. The cur-
rent trend runs contrary to congressional intent, selectively ignores
case precedent, and ignores the needs and requirements of
archaeologists.
THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL APPLICATION OF SECTION 4(F) IN CONTEXT
The Conflict
By its language, section 4(f) creates a special protection for cer-
tain named classes of land.7 These protected lands cannot be used
5. FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, 1984 HIGH-
WAY STATISTICS 113 (1985). An additional 1,753,023 miles of road are unpaved. Id.
6. "It isn't possible to read significance into a layer or level until you know how it lies,
how it was formed, what its composition is, and what its relationship is to the layers above
and below it." M. JOUKOWSKY, A COMPLETE MANUAL OF FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 172 (1980).
7. Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act provides, in part:
The Secretary may approve a transportation program or project requiring the
use of publicly owned land of a public park, recreation area, or wildlife and
waterfowl refuge of national, State, or local significance, or land of an historic
site of national, State, or local significance (as determined by the Federal,
State, or local officials having jurisdiction over the park, area, refuge, or site)
only if-
(1) There is no prudent and feasible alternative to using that land; and
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for transportation projects unless two requirements are met. First,
a "prudent and feasible alternative" must not exist. Second, harm
to the site must be minimized. The use of "and" after the first
requirement indicates that these requirements are cumulative; if
one requirement is not met, the proposed project fails even if it
meets the other.
In 1980, the Department of Transportation adopted a regulation
that applies section 4(f) to archaeological sites.8 In this regulation
the DOT carves out an exception to the lands protected by section
4(f). The Regulation excepts any site from application of section
4(f) if the site is important primarily for the information contained
in each artifact and has minimum value for preservation in place.'
If the DOT determines that the regulatory exception to section
4(f) applies, archaeological sites may be used for a proposed trans-
portation project without considering whether any "prudent and
feasible alternatives" exist.10 The only remaining limit on the use
(2) the program or project includes all possible planning to minimize harm to
the park, recreation area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site result-
ing from the use.
49 U.S.C. § 303(c) (Supp. 1985).
8. The "Archaeological Regulation" states:
(1) Section 4(f) applies to all archaeological sites on or eligible for inclusion
on the National Register, including those discovered during construction, un-
less the Administration, after consultation with the State Historic Preservation
Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation, determines that the
archaeological resource is important chiefly for the information it contains and
has minimum value for preservation in place. Such archaeological resources
which do not warrant preservation in place may be recovered in accordance
with a resource recovery plan developed in compliance with 36 CFR Part 800.
(2) For sites discovered during construction, where preservation of the re-
source in place is warranted, the Section 4(f) process will be expedited. In such
cases, the evaluation of feasible and prudent alternatives will take account of
the level of investment already made and the review process, including the
consultation with other agencies, will be shortened as appropriate.
23 C.F.R. § 771.135(f) (1985).
9. Id.
10. The regulation appears to make a further exception by stating that section 4(f) ap-
plies to those sites "on or eligible for inclusion on the National Register." Id. The National
Register is an inventory, kept by the Department of the Interior, of "districts, sites, build-
ings, structures and objects significant in American history, architecture, archaeology, engi-
neering and culture." 36 C.F.R. § 60.1(a) (1985). One of the possible criteria that makes
sites eligible for inclusion on the Register is if the sites "have yielded, or may be likely to
yield, information important in prehistory or history." 36 C.F.R. § 60.4(d) (1985). This
description applies to any worthwhile archaeological site. This particular distinction, there-
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of such sites is that the DOT must undertake an immediate exca-
vation, or "salvage dig," of the endangered site before any con-
struction is begun.1 This Regulation presents the question of
whether such an exception to the protection of section 4(f) is justi-
fied as a matter of law or of policy. 12
Legislative History
Congress enacted section 4(f) when the general public began to
realize the disturbing consequences brought about by the develop-
ment boom following World War II.13 These consequences included
the loss of important archaeological and historic resources.' 4 His-
toric preservation laws were passed with increasing frequency be-
ginning in the 1950's, apparently carried by the rising tide of the
general environmental movement.1 5
Section 4(f) was one of the laws riding that tide. The immediate
impetus behind section 4(f) was a 1960 proposal for an expressway
that would have cut through Brackenridge Park in San Antonio,
Texas.'6 In response to that city's great public outcry to save the
park, Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas introduced an amend-
fore, does not preclude applying section 4(f) to archaeological sites. Raab & Klinger, A Criti-
cal Appraisal of "Significance" in Contract Archaeology, 42 AMERICAN ANTIQUITY 629, 631
(1977).
11. 23 C.F.R. § 771.135(f)(1) (1985).
12. Other important issues involving section 4(f) include the question of what is a "use"
of the land, and whether a site is historically "significant." For a discussion of these issues,
see Wilburn, Transportation Projects and Historic Preservation: Recent Developments
under Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 2 PRESERVATION L. REP. 2017
(1983).
13. Gray, Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 32 MD. L. REV. 327, 332
(1973).
14. See Rosenberg, Federal Protection for Archaeological Resources, 22 ARIz. L. REV.
701, 710-11 (1980); see also Bullock, Preservation Features: The Headless Horseman Rides
Again, 17 HIST. PRESERVATION 128 (1965), reprinted in 112 CONG. REC. 17,631 (1966) (re-
counting examples of the eruption of public outcry over highways constructed through his-
toric areas).
15. For a discussion of the interrelationship between environmentalism and historic pres-
ervation, see Baldwin, Historic Preservation in the Context of Environmental Law: Mutual
Interest in Amenity, 36 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 432 (1971).
16. For details and background on the proposed project and the litigation surrounding it,
see Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway
Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
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ment to the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1966.17 The amendment
was practically identical to the present section 4(f)." s The propo-
nents of the amendment opined that the DOT was overusing parks
and other publicly owned lands for transportation projects, due to
the relatively low cost of using public lands as opposed to acquir-
ing privately owned lands through condemnation.' 9 The Senate
passed the bill with the amendment,20 but the House of Represent-
atives did not.2 ' A House-Senate Conference Committee substi-
tuted a diluted version, which did not require the DOT to accept
"prudent and feasible alternatives" to using public parklands or
historic sites. Instead, the compromise provision required only that
the harm to the lands be minimized. 22 According to Congressman
Kenneth Gray of Illinois, the House opposed the provision man-
dating the acceptance of prudent and feasible alternatives because
the Committee on Public Works lacked the opportunity to study
the impact of such a requirement on a state's authority over state
parks and historic sites.23 Both houses accepted the Conference
Committee substitute, and that version became law.24
17. Pub. L. No. 89-574, Act of September 13, 1966, 80 Stat. 766 (1966) (current version
codified in scattered sections of 23 U.S.C.).
18. The only substantive difference between the Yarborough amendment and the present
section 4(f) is that the Yarborough amendment did not include recreational areas or wildlife
refuges in the category of lands protected. 112 CONG. REC. 17,631 (1966).
19. See id. at 17,630-44 (1966).
20. Id. at 17,460.
21. Id. at 19,098.
22. The Conference Committee substitute stated:
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that in carrying out the provi-
sions of this title, the Secretary shall use maximum effort to preserve Federal,
State, and local government parklands and historic sites and the beauty and
historic value of such lands and sites. The Secretary shall cooperate with the
States in developing highway plans and programs which carry out such policy.
After July 1, 1968, the Secretary shall not approve under section 105 of this
title any program for a project which requires the use of any land from a Fed-
eral, State, or local government park or historic site unless such program in-
cludes all possible planning, including consideration of alternatives to the use
of such land, to minimize any harm to such park or site resulting from such
use.
Pub. L. No. 89-574, Act of September 13, 1966, 80 Stat. 766, 771 (1966).
23. 112 CONG. REc. 19,098 (1966) (colloquy between Congressman Gray and Congressman
James C. Cleveland of New Hampshire).
24. See id. at 21,192, 21,340-41.
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Two months later, Senator Henry Jackson of Washington of-
fered the Yarborough amendment 25 as an amendment to the pro-
posed Department of Transportation Act. The provision again in-
cluded the mandatory acceptance requirement for prudent and
feasible alternatives. House discussion focused upon the meaning
of the language of section 4(f), particularly the "prudent and feasi-
ble alternatives" requirement.2s Concern centered on the possibil-
ity that the requirement would impose binding limitations upon
the Secretary of Transportation in deciding where to build a pro-
posed transportation project. Congressman Dan Rostenkowski of
Illinois stated that "it is not the intent of Congress to tie the Sec-
retary's hands, 27 and that "as desirable as parkland preservation
might be, other important factors must be considered." ' s Never-
theless, the Jackson amendment emerged from the Conference
Committee intact and became the present section 4(f).
Although the legislative history reflects congressional reluctance
to restrict the discretion of the Secretary of Transportation, it does
not justify the DOT's Archaeological Regulation. The Regulation
essentially exempts a broad class of land from the protection of
25. Senator Warren G. Magnuson of Washington credited Senator Jackson with offering
the amendment while the Act was still under committee consideration. Id. at 26,565.
26. See id. at 26,651-52. The objections voiced two months previously did not emerge. A
possible reason for this new receptiveness was that some members of Congress may have
engaged in political logrolling. The main purpose of the Department of Transportation Act
was to consolidate all of the transportation-related bureaus and agencies into one Cabinet-
level department. The House of Representatives was adamantly opposed to the transfer of
the Maritime Administration to the new Department of Transportation, as the Senate-
passed bill provided. One commentator speculates that the Senate seized the opportunity
for a trade-off and pushed its strong version of section 4(f) on the recalcitrant House, in
exchange for allowing the House to keep the Maritime Administration out of the new DOT.
See Gray, supra note 13, at 337-38. See generally Gray, Environmental Requirements of
Highway and Historic Preservation Legislation, 20 CATH. U.L. REv. 45, 47-55 (1970).
27. 112 CONG. REc. 26,651 (1966).
28. Id. Congressman John Kluczynski, also of Illinois, echoed Mr. Rostenkowski's
sentiments:
There is no question in my mind that the protection of our parks, open spaces,
historic sites, fish and game habitats, and the other natural resources with
which our nation is so richly endowed, is of the utmost importance and ur-
gency, but not to the total exclusion of other considerations. To do so would
result in as many inequities as justifying transportation plans merely on the
basis of economy or efficiency.
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section 4(f).29 Participants in the congressional debate did not con-
sider giving the DOT the discretion to totally avoid section 4(f).
The discretion Congress sought to preserve was the discretion to
define "prudent and feasible." 30 Even those who spoke out against
limiting the Secretary's authority acknowledged that both require-
ments contained in section 4(f) must be applied to any proposed
transportation project involving any lands described in the sec-
tion.3 ' Congress understood the word "prudent" to permit the Sec-
retary to use protected land for transportation projects when the
"feasible" alternative required "displacing hundreds of families," 32
or when foregoing the project for environmental preservation
would risk human life.3 3 The discretion to consider the prudence of
using an alternative transportation site was not envisioned to ex-
tend to the discretion to avoid considering any alternatives when
the Secretary deemed certain land unprotected.
In 1968 Congress reaffirmed the policies contained in section
4(f). The legislators returned to the forerunner of section 4(f), the
diluted Yarborough amendment to the Federal-Aid Highway Act
of 1966,3" but inserted a prudent and feasible alternatives require-
ment, thereby making it identical to the two-year-old section 4(). 3
Statements made during debate on the amendment reinforce the
intent of blanket coverage of section 4(f) whenever protected lands
are involved.3 6 In addition, the Conference Committee Report on
the 1968 bill indicated that the Secretary retained discretion to de-
fine "prudent and feasible" when applying section 4(f),37 and pro-
29. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
30. As understood by Congressman Kluczynski, the word "prudent" supplied the neces-
sary discretion for the Secretary of Transportation: "[w]ith 'prudent' as the operable word,
this section now becomes workable and effective ... ." 112 CONG. Rc. 26,651 (1966).
31. "This approval [of the use of land protected by section 4(f)] is made contingent on
two factors: That there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and
that such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to those areas." Id.
(statement of Congressman Rostenkowski).
32. Id. at 26,652.
33. Id. at 26,651-52
34. See supra note 22.
35. Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1968, § 18, Pub. L. No. 90-495, 82 Stat. 815, 823 (1968).
36. Congressman Chester Holifield of California succinctly described the intent of section
4(f): "In 1966 a dedicated Congress told these [highway, airline, maritime, and railroad]
interests: 'You may go so far and no farther.'" 114 CONG. REC. 19,916 (1968).
37. The conferees stated:
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vided illustrations of situations when choosing an alternative route
for a transportation project would not be prudent.38 The Report's
use of these specific examples demonstrates that Congress did not
intend the Secretary's discretion to extend to the creation of cate-
gorical exceptions to section 4(f).
The legislative history behind the DOT Act and the Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1966 demonstrates that congressional opposition
to section 4(f) arose from concern that the section would force the
Secretary of Transportation to choose alternative routes whenever
transportation projects intersected protected lands. Use of the
word "prudent" in section 4(f) broadened the Secretary's decision-
making authority to prevent automatic route changes. Congress in-
tended, however, that the Secretary engage in the decision-making
process provided in section 4(f) whenever transportation projects
involve protected lands. Broadened discretion over the final deci-
sion does not necessarily translate into discretion to exclude cer-
tain lands from the prescribed decision-making process.
Judicial Interpretation
Most litigation involving section 4(f) has concerned parklands,
paralleling the major concern voiced in the legislative history. Citi-
zens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe"' is the leading judi-
cial interpretation of section 4(f). Overton Park involved a suit by
a citizen's conservation group to enjoin the Secretary of Transpor-
tation from issuing federal funds to build a segment of Interstate
Highway 40 through a city park in Memphis, Tennessee. The Sec-
retary had approved the funds for the highway and had released a
report of his factual findings, but had not included a report indi-
cating why he believed no prudent and feasible alternatives ex-
This amendment of both [section 4(f) and 23 U.S.C. § 138] is intended to
make it unmistakably clear that neither section constitutes a mandatory prohi-
bition against the use of the enumerated land, but rather, is a discretionary
authority which must be used with both wisdom and reason. The Congress
does not believe, for example, that substantial numbers of people should be
required to move in order to preserve these lands, or that clearly enunciated
local preferences should be overruled on the basis of this authority.
CONF. REP. No. 1799, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
3538.
38. Id.
39. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
162 [Vol. 28:155
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isted. The plaintiffs contended that section 4(f) required such a
formal report. In addition, they also claimed that, even if such a
report was not required, prudent and feasible alternatives to the
Overton Park route in fact existed.
The Court construed the "prudent and feasible alternatives" re-
quirement strictly, describing it as a "plain and explicit bar to the
use of federal funds for construction of highways through
parks-only the most unusual situations are exempted. '40 The
Court concluded that Congress must have intended the "prudent
and feasible alternatives" requirement to apply every time pro-
tected lands were involved in a proposed transportation project;41
therefore, the Secretary must produce an administrative record in
order to facilitate judicial review of the Secretary's application of
the section 4(f) criteria.42 In addition, the Court limited the Secre-
tary's discretion to define "prudent." The Court applied a "thumb-
on-the-scale" standard, requiring the Secretary to give the detri-
ment resulting from the destruction of parkland more weight than
such factors as cost, directness of route, and even community dis-
ruption.43 This "thumb-on-the-scale" approach has been followed,
with only minor variations, in subsequent section 4(f) cases involv-
ing parkland.'"
The section 4(f) analysis in parkland cases also applies to dis-
putes involving archaeological sites. For section 4(f) purposes,
courts have treated archaeological and other types of historic sites
40. Id. at 411.
41. "If the statutes are to have any meaning, the Secretary cannot approve the destruc-
tion of parkland unless he finds that alternative routes present unique problems." Id. at 413.
42. Id. at 419. This administrative record need not be a formal finding of fact if other
evidence is adequate. Id.
43. "[I]f Congress intended these factors to be on an equal footing with preservation of
parkland there would have been no need for the statutes." Id. at 412. See generally Note,
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe: Environmental Law and the Scope of
Judicial Review, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1117 (1972) (Overton Park is one of a series of decisions
limiting administrative discretion in order to protect environmental resources.).
44. See, e.g., Druid Hills Civic Ass'n, Inc. v. Fed. Highway Admin., 772 F.2d 700 (11th
Cir. 1985); Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 740 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
2344 (1985); Louisiana Env'tl Soc'y v. Dole, 707 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1983); D.C. Fed'n of Civic
Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972); see also
Maryland Wildlife Fed'n v. Dole, 747 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1984) (if all available alternatives
will impact on 4(f)-protected lands, statute requires balancing process to see which impact is
least).
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the same as parks and other preserved lands, lumping all such
lands under the general rubric of "protected lands." 45 In 1984 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit demon-
strated its belief that section 4(f) applies to all protected lands in
Maryland Wildlife Federation v. Dole.4" The court in Dole re-
jected the notion that one type of protected land has priority over
another, stating that the Supreme Court's analysis in Overton
Park applied to all section 4(f)-protected property.47 The cases
that had applied section 4(f) to archaeological sites before the
adoption of the DOT's Archaeological Regulation essentially fol-
lowed this approach.48
The first case involving application of section 4(f) to an archaeo-
logical site arising after the adoption of the DOT Archaeological
Regulation was Arizona Past and Future Foundation, Inc. v.
Lewis.4" The case suggests an alternative interpretation of the
Archaeological Regulation, although the validity of the Regulation
was not at issue because the Secretary voluntarily applied section
4(f) to the project involved.
The dispute involved a proposed route chosen by the DOT for
the completion of Interstate Highway 10 near Phoenix, Arizona.
The route, however, jeopardized three Native American archaeo-
logical sites. The Arizona State Historic Preservation Office hired
two archaeological research organizations to investigate whether
the sites contained structures that warranted preservation in
45. See, e.g., Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.) (prohibiting freeway
construction next to petroglyph rock), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976); D.C. Fed'n of Civic
Ass'ns v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (enjoining construction of a bridge across
Potomac that would affect Georgetown Historic District until further findings made), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972); Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation
Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971) (Indian artifacts contained in
parkland), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 993 (1972).
46. 747 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1984).
47. Id. at 236.
48. See Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Coleman, 533 F.2d 434 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 999
(1976); Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972), remanded,
484 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1973); see also Thompson v. Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 1167 (E.D. Va. 1972)
(temporarily enjoined condemnation of colonial mansion of historic architectural signifi-
cance to have been used in freeway project).
49. 722 F.2d 1423 (9th Cir. 1983).
164 [Vol. 28:155
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place.50 The organizations concluded that such preservation was
not required.51 Secretary of Transportation Drew Lewis, however,
nevertheless applied section 4(f) and determined that no "prudent
and feasible alternative" route existed. 52 The Department of
Transportation, in conjunction with the Arizona State Historic
Preservation Office and the President's Advisory Council on His-
toric Preservation, then developed an archaeological salvage plan
for the sites. The DOT used section 4(f)'s minimization of harm
requirement 53 as the source of authority for the plan.54 The central
issue in the case was whether the Secretary had acted properly in
concluding that no prudent and feasible alternatives to the pro-
posed route existed.55 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit concluded that, on the basis of the administrative
record, the Secretary could have concluded reasonably that the
proposed route was the only alternative able to provide the neces-
sary transportation service to the central Phoenix area.58
Although this holding may read Overton Park's "thumb-on-the-
scale" approach too narrowly, it illustrates that section 4(f) does
not "tie" the Secretary's hands, even if he applies the provision to
sites that are not deemed to warrant preservation in place. Overton
Park demonstrates that the Secretary retains significant discretion
to define "prudent. ' 57 The fear that, under an interpretation of
section 4(f) that would protect all archaeological sites, a truly nec-
essary and beneficial highway project could be stymied by the acci-
50. The organizations were the State Museum of Arizona and the Museum of Northern
Arizona. Id. at 1427.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
54. The stated purpose of the salvage operation was "to avoid or satisfactorily mitigate
the adverse effect (that the project would have on the sites]." Memorandum of Agreement
between the President's Council on Historic Preservation, the Federal Highway Administra-
tion, the Arizona State Historic Preservation Office and the Arizona State Department of
Transportation (Dec. 29, 1981) (available on file at the U.S. Department of Transportation).
55. 722 F.2d at 1427.
56. Id. at 1428.
57. The statute gives the Secretary of Transportation an "escape hatch" by allowing him
to decide whether a particular alternative is "prudent" in light of the goals of the transpor-
tation project under consideration. Such a scheme is founded on a preference of "guided
common sense to unguided common sense." 2 K DAvis, ADmSTRATzVE LAW TREATISE
§ 8.7, at 187 (2d ed. 1979). Professor Davis believes that the use of "escape clauses" in
rulemaking is "one of the best ways of controlling discretion." Id. at 185.
19.86]
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dental discovery of a few pottery fragments therefore is
unfounded.
Against this background, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit dealt with the conflict between the DOT's
Archaeological Regulation and section 4(f) in Town of Belmont v.
Dole.58 Belmont involved a proposed freeway bypass in New
Hampshire that would run through an archaeological district con-
taining thirteen sites of Native American occupation and eighteen
sites of European settlement. When the director of the historic
preservation program in New Hampshire nominated the district to
* be included in the National Register, he had noted in his report
that the district's significance was "strictly archaeological. 6 0 The
DOT interpreted the report to mean that the artifacts contained in
the district did not warrant preservation in place. Unlike the situa-
tion in Arizona Past and Future Foundation, the Secretary of
Transportation made no attempt to apply the "prudent and feasi-
ble alternatives" requirement of section 4(f). Two New Hampshire
towns near the archaeological district, Belmont and Tilton,
brought suit to force the Secretary to apply section 4(f), claiming
that the DOT's Archaeological Regulation was invalid because it
conflicted with the language and purpose of section 4(f).16 The
court upheld the Regulation, concluding that the Secretary's deci-
sion not to apply section 4(f) to sites not deemed to warrant pres-
ervation in place was reasonable.2
The court relied primarily upon two arguments. First, the court
pointed out that section 4(f), by its terms, applied to historic sites
"of national, State, or local significance."6 " If a site is significant
only for the archaeological data it contains and not for the location
of the site itself, then, the court reasoned, once the data is removed
the site is no longer significant. The court further stated that sec-
58. 766 F.2d 28 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 792 (1986).
59. The nomination of sites to the National Register can be made either by Federal agen-
cies or state historic preservation program officials. 36 C.F.R. §§ 60.5., .6, .9-.11 (1985).
60. First Circuit Upholds Federal Highway Administration Regulation Governing Treat-
ment of Archaeological Sites, 4 PRESERVATION L. REP. 3043 (1985).
61. 766 F.2d at 29-30.
62. Id. at 31-32. For a discussion of the "reasonableness" standard of review, see R.
PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 7.5 (1985).
63. 766 F.2d at 31.
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tion 4(f)'s prohibition on the "use" of certain lands prevents only
those uses that are "adverse in terms of the statute's preservation-
ist purposes. ' 64 A salvage dig does not harm archaeological re-
sources but protects and preserves them. The court concluded,
therefore, that the DOT's Archaeological Regulation actually pro-
motes the process of archaeological preservation. 5
A second way that the Regulation carried out the purpose of sec-
tion 4(f), according to the court, was by taking archaeological sites
out of private hands. The court noted the limited legal protection
of privately owned archaeological sites. If a proposed transporta-
tion project involved an archaeological site that the Secretary
deemed not to warrant preservation in place, then the DOT would
obtain the site through condemnation proceedings and institute a
salvage dig to recover the artifacts before beginning construction.
If, on the other hand, the DOT could not use that site because a
"prudent and feasible alternative" existed, then the DOT would
not obtain the land at all. The site would be left in the hands of
the private owner, who, the court feared, would be "free to ignore,
or even to harm, its archaeological value. '66
ERRORS OF THE CURRENT INTERPRETATION
The current interpretation of section 4(f), as embodied in the
DOT's Archaeological Regulation and in Belmont, is erroneous in
two ways. The first error is in the misinterpretation of congres-
sional intent in determining the role, under section 4(f), of the Sec-
retary of Transportation. The second and less obvious error con-
cerns the policies that justify archaeological preservation itself.
Legal Errors
The Belmont decision rested on the assumption that the resolu-
tion of the possible conflict between the statute and the Regulation
turned upon the application of the standard "reasonableness" test
for the validity of discretionary administrative regulations .6  The
reasonableness standard approach, however, misconceives the ex-
64. Id. at 32.
65. See id. at 32-33.
66. Id. at 32.
67. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
1986]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
tent of discretion granted the Secretary of Transportation by sec-
tion 4(f). The court characterized the effect of the DOT's Archaeo-
logical Regulation as "pick[ing] out those archaeological sites
whose significance lies only in the data they contain that will be at
least equally well preserved outside the site. '6 This interpretation
implies that Congress granted the Secretary authority to "pick
out" such sites. Congress, however, only gave the Secretary limited
discretion to determine whether a particular alternative to a pro-
posed route is prudent and feasible if that proposed route would
adversely affect an archaeological site.69 Authorization to define
"prudent" is not equivalent to the discretion to carve out excep-
tions to section 4(f) not stated explicitly in the statute itself.
The court in Belmont, however, did not consider the legislative
history of section 4(f). Instead, it relied on the policy behind the
Regulation7 0 and determined that the Regulation is consistent with
section 4(f)'s preservationist purpose because the Regulation man-
dates salvage digs for artifacts threatened by road construction.
Additionally, the court stated that salvage digs preserve artifacts
better than leaving them in place.71 A similar statement appears in
the DOT's comment accompanying promulgation of the Regula-
tion. The DOT stated that "[a]pplying section 4(f) to archaeologi-
cal sites where data recovery is appropriate would impose the sec-
tion 4(f) test to sites for which all interested agencies have agreed
that removal of the archaeological material is in the best public
interest. 7 2 Naturally, this reasoning includes the problematic as-
sumption that salvage digs are always in "the best public
interest. '73
The statements made by the court in Belmont and by the DOT
in its comments to the Archaeological Regulation overlook the con-
gressional policy decision to protect parklands and historic sites. 4
68. 766 F.2d at 31.
69. See supra notes 26-37 and accompanying text.
70. See 766 F.2d at 30-33; see also supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
71. 766 F.2d at 32.
72. 45 Fed. Reg. 71,976 (1980).
73. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
74. "It is the policy of the United States Government that special effort should be made
to preserve the natural beauty of the country-side and public park and recreation lands,
wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites." 49 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1982). See also supra
notes 16-37 and accompanying text.
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Congress established specific protections; agency denial of protec-
tion to entire categories of land therefore exceeds legislative au-
thorization. Past judicial constructions of section 4(f) that treat all
historic sites and parkland alike as meriting protection reinforce
their interpretation. 5
The court in Belmont also failed to address a common maxim of
statutory construction. Resorting to judicial interpretation of a
statute is unnecessary if the statute is clear and unambiguous on
its face. 6 The Supreme Court's opinion in Overton Park clearly
shows that the Court considered section 4(f) to mean exactly what
it says: the DOT cannot use certain lands for transportation
projects unless no prudent and feasible alternative exists.77 Con-
gress included no exceptions, and the DOT should not fashion one.
Policy Errors
The court in Belmont also relied on erroneous policy justifica-
tions in upholding the Archaeological Regulation. The major pre-
mise in Belmont was that a DOT-instituted salvage dig would pre-
serve archaeological resources contained on the site, and the
preservationist policies behind section 4(f) would be furthered
rather than harmed. Although this view has superficial appeal, it
overlooks the basic nature of salvage digs. In the archaeological
community, such digs are generally viewed as a last resort, to be
commenced in emergency situations when the archaeological re-
sources will be irretrievably lost if they are not recovered immedi-
ately. 8 For the most part, salvage archaeology is a hurried opera-
tion, the main goal being to save as much as possible as quickly as
possible. Even when conducted by the most respected archaeolo-
gists, the quality of the end product suffers.79 Authorities in the
75. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text.
76. 2A SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (4th ed. 1984). But see
Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643 (1978) (stating that in interpreting a
statute the court opts for a restricted rather than literal meaning of the statute's words
whenever a literal interpretation would lead to "absurd results").
77. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
78. M. JOUKOWSKY, supra note 6, at 4-7 (1980); Lipe, A Conservation Model for American
Archaeology, in CONSERVATION ARCHAEOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGE-
MENT STUDIES 20 (M. Schifter & G. Gumerman eds. 1977).
79. In this situation we are faced with the choice of securing inadequate data or no
data at all. By inadequate data we mean that less than an optimum sample is
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profession have come to accept salvage work as a necessary evil,
and have promulgated guidelines to help distinguish acceptable
shortcuts from unacceptable ones.80 The archaeological resources
involved, however, are still exposed to a greater risk of being over-
looked or destroyed during a salvage dig conducted under rules im-
posed by a road building agency than they would be during an ex-
cavation instituted subject to pure "research archaeology"
standards.
The quality of data extracted from a dig also suffers when the
archaeologist has no control over its location. As in any other sci-
ence, the direction of research in archaeology depends upon prior
discoveries. A significant finding on one archaeological site may
change the approach taken on other sites. Allowing the DOT to
build roads over salvaged archaeological sites rather than forcing
the acceptance of prudent alternatives deprives archaeologists of
the option to preserve those sites for future reappraisal. An archae-
ologist researching a particular theory8 l may learn more from one
site by undertaking an excavation in an older site first. In addition,
he may wish to preserve intact a site containing particularly deli-
cate or minute artifacts, in order to excavate them with improved
technology in the future.
obtained at a greater speed than is the custom in problem-oriented archaeol-
ogy. No lowering of excavation standards is implied.
Hester, A Training Program for Salvage Archaeology, 28 AM. ANTIQUITY 392-93 (1963) (cita-
tions omitted).
80. See THE MANAGEMENT OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL RESOURCES: THE AIRLIE HOUSE REPORT 64-
77 (C. McGimsey & H. Davis eds. 1977); King, Resolving a Conflict of Values in American
Archaeology, in CONSERVATION ARCHAEOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGE-
MENT STUDIES 87-95 (M. Schifter & G. Gumerman eds. 1977). See generally M. JOUKOWSKY,
supra note 6, at 10-12 (ethical considerations for archaeologists).
81. The perception of archaeologists as mere collectors and cataloguers is based on an
erroneous understanding of archaeological research. The archaeological method of research
is based on problems like any other science. Archaeologists identify problems, glean infor-
mation from sources related to that problem, and formulate a theory on the basis of that
information. See generally S. DANIELS & N. DAVID, THE ARCHAEOLOGY WORKBOOK (1982)
(example research problems). Pure research archaeology strives to disturb the site only to
the extent necessary to extract needed information. Lipe, supra note 78, at 42. Salvage work
forces an archaeologist to depart from this systematic methodology by requiring him to find
quickly everything present on a particular site. Some authorities fear that this lack of focus
leads to a further decline in information quality. CONSERVATION ARCHAEOLOGY: A GUIDE FOR
CULTURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT STUDIES 9-11 (M. Schifter & G. Gumerman eds. 1977).
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The court in Belmont embraced the argument that the DOT's
Archaeological Regulation actually promoted the preservation of
archaeological resources. The court stated that if the DOT decided
to use alternative land, no excavation of any kind would be insti-
tuted, and the site would be left in private hands, unprotected
from development and vandalism. The court noted correctly that
section 4(f) fails to prevent the misuse of archaeological resources
found on privately owned land. However, the underinclusive na-
ture of statutory protection should not be used as a basis for re-
ducing the protection of archaeological resources found on public
lands. Instituting salvage digs on recently acquired public property
before starting transportation projects also fails to protect the bulk
of archaeological resources found on private lands.82 Section 4(f)
was meant to protect publicly owned land 3 and should not be ap-
plied to another, wholly distinct problem.
Congress or the state legislatures should face the problem of
misuse of archaeological resources found on private lands by insti-
tuting land-use limitations on private lands containing known
archaeological sites.8 4 Constitutional considerations may prevent
82. Even if salvage digs do preserve archaeological resources, the Regulation would cover
only those sites about to be affected by a transportation project. In addition, during the
congressional debate over the amendment to the Federal-Aid Highway Act (23 U.S.C.
§ 138) in 1968, Senator Lee Metcalf of Montana suggested that the private-hands argument
cuts both ways. If section 4(f) is weakened, owners interested in preserving such lands would
no longer donate them to the public domain. 114 CONG. REc. 24,025 (1968).
83. See 114 CONG. REc. 24,026 (1968); 112 CONG. REc. 14,073 (1966).
84. Private land use restrictions designed to protect archaeological sites would be similar
in effect and purpose to zoning laws, which are the province of state and local governments
as a part of the state police power. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926). State governments, therefore, are probably better equipped to institute such restric-
tions than Congress. One commentator reached the same conclusion concerning preservation
of historic structures in urban areas. Note, Local Historic Preservation Measures as an Al-
ternative to Federal Preservation Efforts, 3 VA. J. OF NAT. RESOURCES L. 263 (1984).
Some states now have use-control laws protecting archaeological sites on private land, but
these are usually contingent upon owner consent. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 41-9-249.1 (Supp.
1985); ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.060(b) (1983); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 267.11 (West 1975); GA. CODE
ANN. § 12-3-53(3) (Supp. 1985); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 6E-10 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 67-4115
(1980); IND. CODE ANN. § 14-3-3.4-8 (Burns Supp. 1985); Ky. REV. STAT. § 164.730, .735
(1980); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25:523 (West 1975); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 9, § 27 (West
1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 138.35(2)(c) (West 1979); Miss. CODE ANN. § 39-7-13 (Supp.
1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 18-6-10(c) (1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 70-1, 70-11 (1985); RL GEN.
LAWS § 42-45.1-10 (1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-20-30 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN.
172 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:155
imposing an unqualified ban upon disturbing such sites.8 5 Never-
theless, less oppressive measures exist that are both constitu-
tionals and workable.87
The policy basis of section 4(f) is preservation. The Belmont
opinion supports the proposition that archaeological resources can
be preserved best by digging them up and moving them out of the
way of highway projects. Archaeologists, however, derive little util-
ity from such "preservation." Archaeological resources are non-re-
§ 11-6-110 (Supp. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-18-26 (Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 763 (1978); VA. CODE § 10-150.7 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 27.53-060 (1982).
Alaska is most protective of archaeological resources and most restrictive of landowners'
property rights. Its relevant provision states:
If an historic, prehistoric, or archaeological property which has been found by
the department. . . to be important for state ownership is in danger of being
sold or used so that its historic, prehistoric or archaeological value will be de-
stroyed or seriously impaired, . . . the department may establish the use of the
property in a manner necessary to preserve its historic, prehistoric or archaeo-
logical character or value. If the owner of the property does not wish to follow
the restrictions of the department, the department may acquire the property
by eminent domain under AS 09.55.240-09.55.460.
ALASKA STAT. § 41.35.060(b) (1983).
For a description of the options available to state and local governments for archaeologi-
cal resource preservation on both public and private land, see Rosenberg, Archaeological
Resource Preservation: The Role of State and Local Governments, 1981 UTAH L. REV. 755,
774-802.
85. Courts have firmly established that if public regulation goes too far in restricting the
private property rights of landowners, the regulation will constitute a "taking" without just
compensation, which is prohibited by the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United
States Constitution. See C. PRITCHETT, CONSTITUTIONAL CIVIL LIBERTIES 289-92 (1984); L.
TRINE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9-2 (1978).
86. A land use regulation is constitutionally acceptable if the owner is not deprived of all
reasonable economic return from the land. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of
New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
87. Even if the government involved forsakes the zoning power and relies exclusively
upon the power of eminent domain to protect archaeological sites in private hands, such a
program need not be more expensive to the taxpayers than the current system. Presently,
the DOT provides all funding for emergency salvage digs instituted under the Archaeologi-
cal Regulation, either directly or through individual state governments. See 23 U.S.C.
§ 104(a) (1982). If the DOT avoided all archaeological sites for transportation projects, this
salvage cost is also avoided. These governmental savings could then be used to purchase
sites purely for their archaeological merit. This method eliminates the need for hurried sal-
vage work on the site. Archaeological research organizations interested in the site, therefore,
may obtain funds for the data extraction process through private channels as part of normal
fundraising efforts. For a description of the different funding techniques available to such
organizations, especially museums, see H. HUDSON, MUSEUMS FOR THE 1980s 166-76 (1977).
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newable.88 These resources, therefore, must be preserved as long as
possible in order for them to continue yielding useful information.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Judicial Solution
The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari in the Belmont
case.8 9 A judicial overruling of Belmont, therefore, is not possible
in the short run. Unfortunately, even this alternative would be an
incomplete solution. If the erroneous assumptions and conclusions
in Belmont were overturned, although the law would better pre-
serve archaeological sites on public lands, those archaeological sites
on private lands would still face the danger of destruction by the
owner. The salvage digs mandated by the DOT's Archaeological
Regulation do not cure this problem. Judicial solution therefore
appears impossible.
Administrative Solution
Administrative resolution supplies the simplest alternative; the
DOT can rescind its Archaeological Regulation. Such administra-
tive action would appear to undo the main source of damage to
section 4(f). Even this alternative is incomplete, however. The Bel-
mont decision may perpetuate the erroneous and damaging inter-
pretation of section 4(f) embodied in the Regulation, acting as pre-
cedent for further exemptions from section 4(f). Mere rescission
only partially compensates for the damage caused by the Regula-
tion. Rescission should be accompanied by affirmative statements
directly opposing the concepts for which the Regulation stood.
Legislative Solution
Amending section 4"(f) is probably both dangerous and unneces-
sary. The Supreme Court construed the language of section 4(f) to
be crystal clear in Overton Park.90 By virtue of Overton Park and
its progeny, section 4(f) is already one of our strongest environ-
88. Lipe, supra note 78, at 19.
89. 106 S. Ct. 792 (1986).
90. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
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mental statutes when applicable. Thus, we must not endanger the
Overton Park interpretation by amending section 4(f). Recognizing
Belmont as an anomaly in the history of section 4(f) is a far more
desirable solution. Congress should attack the problem directly by
strengthening a statute dealing solely with archaeological re-
sources, such as the Antiquities Act,91 the Archaeological Re-
sources Protection Act,92 or another similar statute.9 3 Congress
should add provisions declaring that, in the event of any federal
action significantly affecting an archaeological site, 4 the adminis-
trative agency in charge must treat the archaeological resources
contained in such site as warranting preservation "on site." In ef-
fect, such an amendment would codify the Arizona Past and Fu-
ture Foundation interpretation of section 4(f).95
A legislative remedy best solves the problems of the administra-
tive exceptions to section 4(f) and the lack of protection of
archaeological resources found on private lands. It preserves the
91. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431, 432-33 (1982).
92. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-47011 (1982).
93. Although not strictly dealing with archaeology, another statute that Congress may use
for this purpose is the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80
Stat. 915 (1966) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 470 (1982)). Amending this statute would negate a
subsidiary point made in Belmont. The court reasoned that because the NHPA was enacted
the same day as the Department of Transportation Act, the court should interpret the
DOT's Archaeological Regulation in light of section 106 of the NHPA, which requires
merely that federal agencies "take into account the effect" of a federal undertaking on his-
toric properties. 766 F.2d at 30.
94. To ensure consistency among environmental statutes, the meaning of key words such
as "federal" and "significantly affecting" may be defined in uniformity with similar words
and phrases in another selected statute. The best candidate for this "standard" statute is
probably the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852
(1970). NEPA is by far the most comprehensive environmental statute, with an enormous
body of case law defining its particular terms.
95. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
The amendment should also contain incentives for the states to pass laws instituting pri-
vate land use restrictions in order to avoid potential ill effects from leaving archaeological
sites in private hands. One effective incentive is a provision in the law that provides in-
creased highway and other public works funding to those states that enact such restrictions.
Another such incentive is a provision that reduces existing highway funding in those states
that do not enact any such restrictions by a certain date.
Recently, a similar approach to the second suggested incentive plan proved effective in
persuading state legislatures to raise their legal drinking age to 21. See House Bill Ties
Highway Aid, Drinking Age, Wash. Post, June 8, 1984, at Al, col. 4; D.C., Virginia Seen
Raising Drinking Age: Officials Note Funds for Highways at Stake, Wash. Post, June 29,
1984, at C1, col. 5.
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legislative intent behind section 4(f) and at the same time comple-
ments the functions of the other archaeological statutes involved.
Additionally, it preserves the intellectual freedom of archaeolo-
gists, while still granting the Secretary of Transportation sufficient
discretion to define the "prudent and feasible" test to be applied
to individual alternatives. Moreover, the solution will have the
practical benefit of speeding the construction process. When the
Secretary chooses highway routes that do not require salvage digs,
the DOT can begin construction immediately, rather than prod-
ding harried archaeologists to finish their dig."
CONCLUSION
Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act is no
longer the strong preservationist statute that Congress envisioned.
The Department of Transportation's Archaeological Regulation
and the decision in Belmont have weakened section 4(f) by exclud-
ing certain kinds of archaeological resources from its protection.
These archaeological resources remain part of our nation's heritage
and deserve adequate protection.
Creating a fast, efficient, and inexpensive transportation network
that binds our nation together and contributes to commerce is cer-
tainly a laudable goal. Even before modern American culture put a
premium on mobility and speed, ease of travel was very impor-
tant.9 7 Yet the values represented by archaeology are also impor-
tant."8 Section 4(f) stands for the proposition that we should sacri-
fice other important values for the sake of the roadbuilders only if
no other "prudent and feasible alternative" exists.
Stanley D. Olesh
96. Archaeological excavations require extreme care and attention to detail. Thus, even
an emergency salvage dig may take years. See, e.g., R. MARSHALL, HIGHWAY ARCHAEOLOGY
REPORT NUMBER ONE 2 (1965) (three years between initial survey of proposed route to the
first published report). Quality research and preservation in a non-salvage situation takes
even longer. For a description of the meticulous care taken in the excavation of Colonial
Williamsburg, see Wertenbaker, The Archaeology of Colonial Williamsburg, 1953 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION 447 (1954).
97. The recurring 'allegorical image of roads or paths as symbols of the course of life itself
indicates how important ancient man considered safe travel. See, e.g., Proverbs 4:26 ("Make
level paths for your feet/and take only ways that are firm.").
98. "For everything that was written in the past was written to teach us." Romans 15:4.
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